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THE WORDLESS MYSTICAL AND THE
SPIRITUALITY OF BELIEF
JEFFREY DUDIAK

I

n our day, at least among what passes as urbane and polite
company, anything short of an enthusiastic affirmation of the full
range of religious expression, including none, as anything other than
the manifestation of an enriching difference, and as the enlightened
antidote to any suggestion that some religion is true to the exclusion
of others, means that one risks being stained with the dirtiest of
modernist sobriquets: that of being a “fundamentalist”! In fact,
this litmus test of liberality, dividing the drive toward acidic ethnoscleansing in the name of universal reason,1 on the one hand, from
the base, parochial mythos of ein Volk, in the name of simple common
sense, on the other, separates, from both sides, “us” against “them.”
Anyone who has travelled widely among Friends, weaving their vine
through our various branches, would be hard pressed to imagine that
we do much if anything more than simply reproduce this dichotomy
among ourselves, across which we, too, are polarized and, it seems
to me, paralyzed—at least insofar as we might hope to think beyond
our particular ideological boxes, insofar, that is, as we might hope to
think.
That is, behind the “self-evident,” liberal Quaker truth that
religious hybridity is a sign of intellectual sophistication and spiritual
progress, as behind the contemporary version of the opposing camp
that sees in such dalliances an infidelity to genuine, historic, Christian
Quakerism, lies a metaphysic that is not only far from self-evident,
but that establishes the divide around which the opposing sides rally
precisely their opposition—and as a philosopher it is that shared
framework, rather than the polemics issuing from either side, that
most interests me. I have explored this phenomenon elsewhere, and in
this brief presentation can only provide some indications and possible
implications of it, beginning and focusing on the understandings that
underwrite the side of the argument for which the acceptance and
celebration of religious hybridity has become both a point of pride
and an unchallenged tenet of faith.
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THE WORDLESS MYSTICAL
Ever since Rufus Jones brought his significant intellectual gravitas and
lavish moustache to bear upon the Religious Society of Friends, it has
become standard fare among liberal Friends to understand Quakerism
as a mystical religion, even as that understanding has been virtually
ignored by Prof. Jones’s own orthodox tradition, and rejected by
Quaker evangelicals. As a non-originally liberal Friend (although it
is in a liberal meeting that I now have my membership), perhaps I
can be forgiven for never being quite sure what these Friends mean,
positively speaking, by mysticism, or for suspecting that it does not
quite mean the same for all. It is not that I am totally opposed to some
holy obfuscation. In fact, I myself frequently labour to introduce a
measure of just this when things get a little too certain, even when
we get a little too dogmatic about our uncertainty itself—which,
with mysticism, often appears to be the case. Indeed, the claim to
mysticism seems most pointedly, and in practice, to play a restrictive
role: the banishment of the definitive, that is, of definitions, at least in
matters religious.2
This identification with mysticism is most often fleshed out across
the traditional Quaker assertion that the real action, religiously
speaking, transpires “beyond words,” which is accompanied by the
idea that if the depth of mystical experience is not simply negated
by an attempt to translate it into discursive signifiers, it at least
exceeds them to an inexhaustible degree, rendering them inept (if
not laughably or sadly pathetic) attempts to capture in a thought the
reality aimed at. Faulting and finite words—human logoi—when they
do not hinder true, “wordless” religious experience, at least fall short
enough that if they are yet called upon to function as a crutch, even a
necessary one, as the spiritually lame learn to walk, they must certainly
be transcended if one is, religiously speaking, to run, and especially
if one is to soar. In any case, on this schema mysticism is opposed
to theo-logy, to the idea that any logoi would be adequate to that
which is “reached” in mystical experience—for “God” too is but a
word, even if the Word par excellence.3 Theology, then, is perceived,
if not with disdainful condescension, then at least with sympathetic
toleration, “if one needs that sort of thing,” provided one does not
take it too seriously, that is, as other than a via point as opposed to
a terminus, as an optional, and ultimately inadequate, idiolect. Of
course, the early Friends, who translated to us moderns this ancient,
apophatic motif, never wearied of describing their experience, and its
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Source—and, moreover, without much ambiguity—as quite certainly
“this rather than as that,” in broadside after broadside, pamphlet
after pamphlet, in sermon after interminable sermon, in treatise
after polemic, proliferating their testimony to it at a truly prodigious
rate. So if we modern, liberal Friends yet adhere to this teaching, we
certainly seem to understand it in a radically different way than did
our forebears, for better or for worse.
Nevertheless, there is both some phenomenological and some
theoretical (including theological) warrant for such an intuition, and,
technically speaking, for the priority of intuition over interpretation
in the affairs of the spirit.4 For example, take the very element in
which we bathe: the air we breathe, the ground beneath our feet and
the skies above our heads, the energies that compose and sustain us,
and of which we ourselves dispose. The modality in which we relate
most fundamentally to all of this is always prior to, and conditions the
condition of possibility for, perceiving it as an object over against us,
the latter always a derivative, and partial, relationship to that which
first sustains us. Now, my suspicion is that for at least those whose
spiritual sensibilities have been forged across the Abrahamic religions,
that which exceeds definitive description is not so much a matter of
an element from which we emerge,5 as it is a “voice” that calls us
forth: “let there be …, and there was … .” Religious life, which on
this model is all of life, is vocational; we are always already a response
to a call prior to whatever attempt we might subsequently make at
conceptualizing this lived reality, and which necessarily exceeds it
by an essential degree, because any attempt at conceptualization is
already implicated in it as interior to the process it would hope, après
coup, to circumscribe.
But pushed to the extreme, that is, in converting this sensitivity
into a principle, this framework renders concern for the theological
(in the broad sense of anything we might “say” about the content of
our religious experience) otiose, or at least diminishes it to the point of
indifference. How one says things, if one need say anything at all, does
not matter. One does not, at least insofar as one transposes oneself
down to the level of the truly fundamental, hear the words, which serve
merely an auxiliary function in any case, but “feel where the words
come from,”6 which is what counts, after all, even if no specification
can be given of that “where” without lapsing into precisely what is
to be avoided. The result is that we are left speaking as vaguely and
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elusively with each other as possible—which usually means speaking
about something else.7 This is the new basis of our (religious?) society,
then, that struggles not to give collective articulation to our religious
experience, but unites around our principled refusal to do so.
Such a schema, of course, opens the field to all comers. One is
encouraged to be “open to new light, from whatever source it may
come,”8 welcomed to draw on other traditions—religious, spiritual,
pagan, secular—to supplement, and even transform, the Quaker way,
provided, of course, that any beliefs articulated across such borrowings
are taken as conduits for spiritual exploration and edification, and do
not transgress the prohibition against claims to trans-personal truth.
So, let them all come!: Hindu-Quakers, Jewish-Quakers, WiccaQuakers, non-theist-Quakers, and whatever else one fancies, to join
the now also hyphenated older-order liberal-Quakers, OrthodoxQuakers, Evangelical-Quakers, and Conservative-Quakers.

THE SPIRITUALITY

OF

BELIEF

And, yet, one is perhaps not being simply flippant in wondering
whether this phenomenon testifies to the healthy expansiveness of
Quaker spirituality, or, as we stock our spiritual pantry with borrowed
victuals, to the poverty of contemporary, Quaker religious life. Might
a richer engagement with our own religious tradition provide a
depth that the currently practiced, stripped-down version—open to
everything because committed to nothing but openness itself—simply
cannot?
One wonders, also, along with Derek Guiton in his recent,
controversial book (which, more often than we are comfortable with,
speaks truth to the power of our “liberal orthodoxy”), whether,
despite the liberal Quaker creed that “all we are doing is using
different language to refer to the same thing, … it is obvious that we
are using the same language to refer to different things.”9 That is, is
the mantra that we are all saying the same thing, despite a plethora
of incommensurable assertions, not rather a dogmatic assertion that
blinds us to the reality that this claim itself is a matter of religious
belief, in fact the imposition of a master-belief that enforces one
particular version of religious metaphysics, a version that henceforth
governs acceptable and unacceptable forms and modes of religious
expression under the benign banner of “toleration:” for the “belief”
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that the essential is beyond words, across the shape given to mysticism
in modernity, henceforth organizes and polices the entire religious
landscape of contemporary (liberal) Friends. Could it be that our
supposed unity is in fact illusory, and unachievable on the non-terms
across which it is confessed, unless it is imposed?
In contrast to this heretical orthodoxy, I would like to entertain
the possibility that beliefs do matter, and this because, hermeneutically
considered, we not only give formation to our traditions, but are
formed by them, across what H.-G. Gadamer refers to (in one of
the least musical of phrases in one of the least musical of languages)
as wirkungsgeschichtlishe Bewusstsein, or the “historical formation of
consciousness.” To belong to a religious tradition is to participate in
a trajectory of response to a call that, while always open to critique
and expansion and innovation, has among its functions the ongoing
articulation of that call itself in creative continuity with the tradition in
question—the dialectic between creativity and continuity constituting
the living spirit of that particular tradition qua tradition.10 This
circularity between our traditions and our experience of “the divine”
or “God” or “the Spirit” or “the Life Force” or what have you (as
there is no neutral, non-tradition-bound articulation of “that which
calls”11), each conditioning the other, is I think a better description
of a living spirituality than is the static (and I suspect illusory)
phenomenon that we have an immediate connection to the divine, if
that is taken to mean one that is neither nourished by, nor demands,
articulation.
Neither I nor you, I suspect, want to be counted among those
“closed-minded, sticks-up-their-butts” who balk at the welcoming of
one and all into the Quaker fold. And there is no question that the
liberalizing, universalizing tendency among this particular caste of
contemporary Friends has yielded some very good fruit. But, short of
swallowing whole the metaphysic entailed by the modernist reading
of mysticism, it is not self-evident that every attempt at hyphenation
will succeed in enriching the Quaker trajectory. If conservatives tend
to too readily shy away from innovation out of fear of losing what they
have got, liberals tend to be too quick to adopt the new, mindless of
what of worth is being left behind. Indeed, the debate over whether
hybridity evinces the maturation of Quakerism or its degeneracy is
among the most crucial in our generation, and we should perhaps be
mindful of reflexively allowing this question to be approached in such
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dichotomous, either-or, terms. For myself, I am still trying to discern
the meaning of our hybridity, and the underlying structures against
which we might understand and evaluate it.

ENDNOTES
1. The reason why this trajectory can accommodate every and all religious expression (up
to a point!) is that in each case such expressions are permitted only insofar as they are
“reasonable,” i.e., subject to a purportedly universal Reason, and thus “domesticated”
(i.e., largely privatized). The use of the term “fundamentalism” is an intimidation tactic
employed by us liberals to label and isolate any religious expression that refuses to be
brought to heel, that refuses to bow down before the true God: human Reason.
2. This is why non-theist (as opposed to agnostic) Friends are not really liberals in this
sense; for them the non-existence of God is quite certain.
3. Emmanuel Levinas has provocatively denominated the name/word “God” (i.e., “the
admission of the stronger than me and in me”) as “the apex of vocabulary.” Emmanuel
Levinas, Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence, trans. A. Lingis (The Hague: Martinus
Nijhoff, 1981), 156.
4. In hermeneutic terms, “intuition” names an immediate relationship with that to which
I relate, suggesting direct access, whereas “interpretation” names a mediated relationship, enacted across something else—language, for example.
5. As tends to be the case, at least across a rough and ready characterization, for “pagan”
religions.
6. John Woolman, in his Journal, records these often quoted words by a native American
chief who asked that Woolman’s address not be translated, for, as Papunchang said: “I
love to feel where the words come from.”
7. The alibi of not taking religious expression seriously results in the phenomenon of not
taking religion seriously, and for our placing our focus elsewhere, perhaps in social work,
activism, or politics. However, it is not clear that Quakers can continue to make unique
contributions even in these areas if they are severed from the religious sensitivities that
birthed those concerns and gave shape to often quite distinctive, Quakerly approaches
to them.
8. This frequently quoted phrase is drawn from Quaker Faith & Practice: The book of
Christian discipline of the Yearly Meeting of the Religious Society of Friends (Quakers) in
Britain (London: Britain Yearly Meeting, 4th ed., 2009), Advice number 7. Interestingly,
the following line—“Do you approach new ideas with discernment?”—is almost never
quoted along with it.
9. Derek Guiton, A Man that Looks on Glass (Milton Keynes: FeedARead Publishing,
2015), p. 6.
10 . One of the most important aspects of engaging a tradition is that it provides the possibility of an “other” perspective that can call into critical question contemporary assumptions.
Without this broader perspective, without a deep respect for traditions, we are more
blindly enslaved to present prejudices than we might otherwise be. If on the one side (the
orthodox), we Quakers have forgotten our tradition’s suspicion of religious traditions and
have too readily sought to ground ourselves in them in an uncritical way, on the other
(liberal) side we have too often employed our tradition’s suspicion of religious traditions
as an excuse to jettison anything in the tradition that does not “speak to our condition” as
thoroughgoing “moderns”—often impoverishing ourselves in the process.
11. Indeed, our preference for one or another of these terms, and our allergy to others, is
itself a product of our experience of, and engagement with, our traditions.

